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Justice Scalia’s Innocence Tetralogy 
Lee Kovarsky
†
 
For many, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia’s 
criminal-justice legacy discloses nothing more than pitched 
resistance to the rights of defendants and convicted offenders. 
Certain features of his jurisprudence, however, complicate that 
caricature considerably.
1
 For example, he moonlighted as the 
Court’s most ardent defender of the Sixth Amendment right to 
confront accusing witnesses.
2
 His pro-defense positions formed 
a trial-oriented proceduralism in which he de-prioritized 
constitutional regulation of outside-the-courtroom behavior, 
such as policing or the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
3
 
The trial orientation of Justice Scalia’s proceduralism 
entailed commitments to certain institutions and skepticism of 
others. It formed the basis of his belief that federal courts were 
unsuited for evaluating guilt in state criminal cases, and it 
reflected his distaste for post-conviction procedure. These two 
institutional preferences intersect at a relatively modern 
doctrinal phenomenon: the concept of “actual innocence” 
litigated in federal habeas corpus proceedings, and usually in 
capital cases. In actual innocence litigation, a convicted 
offender asserts a mistaken guilt determination as a 
constitutional error. 
Justice Scalia’s position on actual innocence issues was 
inseparable from his hostility to death penalty “abolition,” and 
he viewed abolitionists as ringleaders of the wrongful-
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 1. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in 
Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of 
Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183 (2005) (scrutinizing Justice Scalia’s 
surprising pro-defendant streak). 
 2. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (writing for the 
Court). 
 3. But see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (finding that use of 
heat-sensing device was surveillance that, when conducted without a warrant, 
violated the Fourth Amendment). 
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convictions movement. Sensing the threat that wrongful 
executions posed to the sanctity of state criminal process, he 
spent his latter years on the Bench arguing that estimates of 
such events were inflated. He was unable, however, to 
command a majority on his more controversial ideas about 
actual innocence in death penalty cases. Instead, his officially 
expressed views appear in a “tetralogy” of auxiliary opinions: 
opinions concurring with judgments in Herrera v. Collins
4
 and 
Kansas v. Marsh,
5
 an opinion concurring with the denial of 
certiorari in Callins v. Collins,
6
 and an opinion dissenting from 
the order granting a fact-finding transfer to a district court in 
In re Troy Davis.
7
 
Collectively, the Tetralogy captures Justice Scalia at both 
his most and his least effective. His sometimes-dazzling 
epistemological critique forced a more analytically rigorous 
restatement of actual innocence doctrine. His foundational 
premise, however, was that the reliability of state guilt 
determinations was not systematically overstated. As evidence 
inconsistent with that premise mounted, however, he refused to 
acknowledge its enormous doctrinal implications. By the time 
of his death, his basic epistemological insight had become the 
most effective weapon against the deference to state criminal 
process that he had originally used it to promote. 
I. THE TETRALOGY 
In a “freestanding” actual innocence claim, a convicted 
offender asserts that she is factually innocent, and asserts 
innocence as the exclusive source of a constitutional violation. 
For the remainder of this article and unless otherwise 
indicated, I use the phrase “innocence claim” to refer to a 
freestanding challenge. An innocence claim alleges that an 
inmate is actually innocent of whatever crime triggered her 
conviction, notwithstanding that she is legally guilty by virtue 
of an adverse criminal judgment. The Tetralogy is, I submit, a 
meaningful unit of study insofar as it represents the full arc of 
Justice Scalia’s actual innocence jurisprudence. 
The actual innocence claim lacks clear constitutional 
provenance, and it is made in federal post-conviction (habeas) 
 
 4. 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
 5. 548 U.S. 163 (2006). 
 6. 510 U.S. 1141 (1994). 
 7. 557 U.S. 952 (2009). 
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proceedings. Concurring in Herrera, Justice Scalia penned 
what is considered by many to be the opening modern salvo 
against actual innocence challenges.
8
 His Herrera concurrence 
embraced a proceduralist view of guilt that appeared to 
strongly disfavor federal consideration of innocence claims. In 
subsequent Tetralogy opinions, he restated and refined the 
epistemological premises behind his position. 
A. HERRERA 
In Herrera, the Court inquired as to whether a 
freestanding innocence claim alleged a cognizable 
constitutional violation.
9
 In one sense, the case was an 
imperfect test vehicle for actual innocence theory because the 
inmate’s new evidence was not particularly strong. The guilt 
determination, however, relied on categories of evidence—
blood-typing, eyewitness identification, and a confession—that 
wrongful-conviction studies would later reveal to be deeply 
problematic. 
Texas had capitally sentenced Herrera for the shooting 
deaths of two police officers. One of the slain officers had a 
passenger that identified Herrera and, in a dying declaration, 
the officer did the same.
10
 When police arrested Herrera, they 
found an inculpatory letter and keys to his girlfriend’s car, 
which had been used in the murder.
11
 The type of blood on 
Herrera’s pants and in the car matched with one of the officers, 
and Herrera’s social security card was found at the scene.
12
 The 
case, however, still had problems. There had been enormous 
pressure to find the officers’ killer, and police almost killed 
Herrera during interrogation.
13
 He had to be taken—
unconscious, bleeding, and paralyzed—to the hospital.
14
 The 
press covered the murder and interrogation heavily and 
uniformed police packed the courtroom.
15
 Eyewitness 
identifications figured prominently in the prosecution’s case, 
 
 8. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 428–29 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 9. See id. at 393. 
 10. See id. at 394. 
 11. See id. at 394–95. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See Brief for Petitioner at 4, Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) 
(No. 91-7328), 1992 WL 532878 [hereinafter Herrera Petitioner’s Brief]. 
 14. See id. at 9–10. 
 15. See id. at 13. 
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even though they were made under circumstances that modern 
forensic analysts would immediately flag as extremely 
unreliable.
16
 
Herrera alleged freestanding innocence in the federal 
habeas proceeding, asserting that his recently deceased brother 
had actually killed both officers. Herrera introduced evidence 
from a former cellmate and a current state judge who both 
stated that Herrera’s brother had told them that he had 
committed the murders while driving the car that belonged to 
Herrera’s girlfriend.
17
 Herrera supplemented the record with an 
affidavit of his nephew, who said that when he was nine years 
old, he saw his father (Herrera’s brother) kill the officers.
18
 
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote an opinion for the Court 
equivocating about whether an inmate alleging only a wrongful 
guilt determination was actually claiming an error of 
constitutional dimension—although he formally reserved the 
possibility that a “truly persuasive showing of innocence” might 
entitle an inmate to habeas relief.
19
 There were four auxiliary 
opinions, and Justice Scalia’s rejection of innocence claims 
became a centerpiece of the case to foreclose freestanding 
innocence litigation entirely. He called attention to “the 
reluctance of the present Court to admit publicly that Our 
Perfect Constitution lets stand any injustice, much less the 
execution of an innocent man who has received, though to no 
avail, all the process that our society has traditionally deemed 
adequate.”
20
 Indeed, he expressed skepticism that they would 
ever have to answer the actual innocence question, because “it 
is improbable that evidence of innocence as convincing as 
 
 16. According to Herrera’s briefing, Hernandez could not select Herrera in 
the original six-person photo array, but he narrowed it down to three people. 
Hernandez was shown a single photo of Hernandez days later—a mug shot—
at which point he told the officers that Herrera was the person who had shot 
Officer Carrisalez. Hernandez subsequently picked Herrera out of another 
lineup. See id. The Carrisalez ID was a “hospital show-up,” in which 
Carrisalez simply nodded at the mugshot. Carrisalez never picked Herrera out 
of a lineup. See id. Hospital show-ups are “widely condemned” but in many 
cases permitted because there is no other way to get the information from a 
dying witness. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). 
 17. The allegation was that Officer Rucker had been involved in 
racketeering with multiple members of the Herrera family, including Leonel 
(the convicted inmate) and Raoul Sr. (Leonel’s brother). See Herrera 
Petitioner’s Brief at 26. 
 18. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 397. 
 19. Id. at 417. 
 20. Id. at 428 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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today’s opinion requires would fail to produce an executive 
pardon.”
21
 
B.  JUSTICE SCALIA’S POST-HERRERA POSITIONS 
At least three distinct propositions are embedded in Justice 
Scalia’s position. First, “actual innocence” is a misleading label 
insofar as innocence is not presumed; the pertinent question 
involves whether the Constitution entitles a legally guilty 
inmate to additional process when new evidence makes guilt 
less likely. Second, when state process is full and fair, 
additional federal process yields little incremental knowledge 
about past reality. And third, state process would screen any 
innocence claim with evidence sufficient to meet the Court’s 
hypothetical threshold. 
Justice Scalia would periodically return to Herrera’s 
precise doctrinal question (actual innocence claims) and to the 
more general point about the institutional competence of 
federal courts conducting post-conviction review of state 
criminal judgments. In 1994, a year after Herrera, Justice 
Blackmun used Callins v. Collins to announce his practice of 
conscientious dissent in all capital cases; he declared that, 
“from this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the 
machinery of death.”
22
 Justice Scalia responded acerbically in 
this second Tetralogy opinion, chalking changing views of the 
death penalty up to the “deeply held” convictions of 
abolitionists and remarking that lethal injection seemed a 
peaceful death as compared to “the case of the 11-year-old girl 
raped by four men and then killed by stuffing her panties down 
her throat.”
23
 Justice Scalia was referencing McCollum v. North 
Carolina, a case co-pending on the Court’s certiorari docket, 
and he used McCollum to argue that capital punishment 
schemes are necessary to permit “such brutal deaths to be 
avenged.”
24
 
Kansas v. Marsh occasioned Justice Scalia’s third 
Tetralogy opinion,
25
 which he used to contest the empirical risk 
of wrongful executions. He wrote: “[Justices flagging the 
possibility of wrongful executions do] not discuss a single 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 23. Id. at 1143 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 24. Id. 
 25. 548 U.S. 163 (2006). 
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case—not one—in which it is clear that a person was executed 
for a crime he did not commit.”
26
 He saw exonerations not as 
evidence of dysfunction, but as proof that the system was 
working.
27
 He argued that the empirical studies suggesting 
elevated rates of wrongful executions were ivory work product 
of abolitionist academics.
28
 He concluded: “One cannot have a 
system of criminal punishment without accepting the 
possibility that someone will be punished mistakenly. . . . But 
with regard to the punishment of death in the current 
American system, that possibility has been reduced to an 
insignificant minimum.”
29
 
The proposition that innocence claims lack constitutional 
provenance surfaced most recently in the Davis case (2009),
30
 
the final piece of the Tetralogy. As explained in Section II.C, 
Davis had been convicted primarily on the basis of cross-racial 
eyewitness identification, and there was substantial post-trial 
recantation.
31
 The Supreme Court ultimately remanded Davis 
for fact-finding on the actual innocence question.
32
 Justice 
Scalia objected to the remand as a “fool’s errand,”
33
 
emphasizing the integrity of the state proceedings and the non-
cognizability of innocence claims. Davis shows that, between 
1993 and 2009, Justice Scalia believed nothing about the actual 
innocence calculus had changed. 
II. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF GUILT 
The Tetralogy captures the arc of Justice Scalia’s critique, 
as he fought ferociously, and at times scornfully, against both 
the doctrinal innovation necessary to facilitate innocence 
litigation and the empirical premises upon which such 
innovation was based. The Supreme Court decided Herrera in 
the spring of 1993, a year after Peter Neufeld and Barry Scheck 
founded an organization called the “Innocence Project” and 
before hundreds of DNA exonerations extinguished the 
comfortable fiction that wrongful convictions were rarities in 
 
 26. Id. at 188. 
 27. See id. at 193. 
 28. Id. at 198. 
 29. Id. at 199. 
 30. In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952 (2009). 
 31. See Lee Kovarsky, Original Habeas Redux, 97 VA. L. REV. 61, 100 
(2011). 
 32. See Davis, 557 U.S. at 952. 
 33. Id. at 957 (Scalia, J, dissenting). 
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American criminal punishment. Workable criminal justice 
administration undeniably entails some wrongful guilt 
determinations, but the tolerance for such error should relate 
inversely to its frequency. 
Justice Scalia’s position was grounded in an epistemology 
associated with law professor Paul Bator and philosopher Karl 
Popper.
34
 Stated generally, Justice Scalia believed that humans 
(and their institutions) cannot “know” the pure metaphysical 
truth of past events. Human institutions, lacking such 
epistemological privilege, instead use reliable process to 
produce estimates and make decisions. Criminal process 
therefore assigns guilt through a series of factual 
determinations that merely estimate reality. Justice Scalia 
perceived no reason why the truth-approximating process of 
state legal institutions would be inferior to that of federal ones, 
and so he saw no need for the doctrinal innovation necessary to 
facilitate actual innocence litigation. 
When Justice Scalia penned his Herrera concurrence, his 
epistemological critique combined with contemporaneous 
assumptions about the reliability of evidence to produce 
profound skepticism about whether courts should entertain 
freestanding innocence claims. Prior to DNA testing, almost 
nobody asserted actual innocence claims, and relief was non-
existent.
35
 When the data behind the assumptions changed, 
however, Justice Scalia’s position did not. In later decisions, 
Justice Scalia was simply unwilling to go where his preferred 
framework took him. 
A. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF TRUTH 
When Justice Scalia wrote about actual innocence, he 
always put the term in quotation marks. The scare quotes 
betray something surprisingly post-modern in his view of 
innocence. Specifically, his position reflects epistemological 
uncertainty that is largely ignored by the formalism with which 
he is frequently (and superficially) associated. Indeed, he 
inherits his epistemological premises from Professor Paul 
Bator, who in turn leans heavily on those of Karl Popper.
36
 
 
 34. See Seth F. Kramer and David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: 
Factual Innocence and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 547, 
519 n.217 (2000). 
 35. See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 
61 (2008). 
 36. See Kramer and Rudovsky, supra note 34, at 519 n.217. 
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Absolute truth in the natural world might exist, the theory 
goes, but humans cannot “know” it with metaphysical 
certainty. A state criminal conviction is an index of truth that 
might reflect subordinate indicia that we call evidence—things 
like confessions, eyewitness testimony, and forensic evidence. 
That evidence can create inferences about historical fact, and 
those inferences range from extremely reliable to pure 
guesswork. As Herrera itself explains, a subsequent forum 
might be uniquely disadvantaged in drawing reliable inferences 
about unknowable facts because “the passage of time only 
diminishes the reliability of criminal adjudications.”
37
 
If one admits to the imperfection of human observation and 
assessment, Justice Scalia believed, then there is no compelling 
reason to have federal courts review pure questions of guilt. 
State and judicial institutions are both made up of imperfect 
human actors, and one is not necessarily a better truth 
approximator than the other. To the extent that new evidence 
permits new inferences about unknowable facts, the 
opportunity to draw those inferences trades off with the ability 
to reliably draw others. Witnesses may have disappeared, 
memories may have faded, and physical evidence from trial 
might be degraded or unavailable. 
The undeniable appeal of Justice Scalia’s position resides 
in its suggestion that to accommodate actual innocence 
litigation is to deny the most basic tenets of post-modernism. 
Actual innocence theories might appear to embrace a quaint, 
pre-postmodern view of some observer-independent truth. 
Justice Scalia would have argued that we do not—that we 
cannot—determine actual innocence. Instead, we can just have 
rules about when institutions treat a sufficient approximation 
of guilt as binding. 
The problem with the argument is that a universe in which 
absolute truth is unknowable can also be one with substantial 
variation in the reliability of scientific, social, and institutional 
devices that we use to imperfectly assign guilt. Justice Scalia’s 
scare-quoting made sense when the most reliable indicia of 
metaphysical truth were not uniquely available in a 
subsequent forum. Herrera posed certain challenges, but not 
others. Although the case certainly stood for a broader 
institutional question about the availability of a federal habeas 
forum to test new evidence, there was a nagging sense that the 
 
 37. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993). 
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new evidence in the case itself was not particularly reliable. 
Affidavits exculpating the condemnee and assigning guilt to a 
deceased alternative are common, and there were serious 
questions about the incentives of Herrera’s nephew. 
If the question is not about whether someone is “actually” 
innocent and is instead about when new evidence of innocence 
requires a new forum to consider inferences, then there may be 
good institutional reasons to refuse such incremental process. 
What Justice Scalia ultimately failed to acknowledge, however, 
was that such an argument works only when one can make pre-
DNA-era assumptions about the reliability of the inferences 
themselves. If, for example, inferences drawn from a DNA 
exclusion are many orders of magnitude more powerful than 
inferences drawn from a criminal conviction, then Justice 
Scalia’s proceduralist framework does not just seem to permit a 
new forum for reconsideration—it seems to require it. The 
requirement is not because an inmate has “actually” shown 
innocence, but because the investment in new inferential 
approximation is worth the return. 
B. CHANGING ASSUMPTIONS 
The problem for Justice Scalia, and for Herrera enthusiasts 
generally, was two-fold. First, jury verdicts and guilty pleas are 
now known to be less reliable estimates of historical truth than 
we previously thought. Second, other types of evidence (DNA) 
capable of being introduced in subsequent legal proceedings 
have emerged as more reliable ones. 
Rejecting the idea that humans and their institutions can 
“actually” know (verify) innocence is distinct from the 
proposition that they should not entertain what are 
euphemistically called actual innocence claims. The latter 
proposition ignores a circumstance that is perfectly compatible 
with post-modern assumptions about the absence of 
epistemological privilege. If advances in scientific knowledge 
establish certain evidence as more reliable indicia of objective 
historical truth than is a criminal conviction, then the 
empirical complement to Justice Scalia’s doctrinal critique 
vanishes. 
DNA evidence is not available in most cases, and even in 
cases where it is available, it may be only one piece of a broader 
culpability puzzle. In select cases, however, it is capable of 
showing, with extraordinarily high probability, that a convicted 
offender could not have committed the crime in question. 
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Insofar as DNA evidence flags wrongful convictions, academics 
can work backwards to understand what types of evidence 
produce them. The major culprits are eyewitness testimony, 
shoddy forensic science, and, to a lesser extent, false 
confessions and informants.
38
 In other words, DNA does not 
just show likely innocence in specific cases, but it also performs 
a broader diagnostic function insofar as it provides clues about 
the unreliability of other types of evidence. 
Justice Scalia refused to attribute such diagnostic 
significance to DNA exonerations. Indeed, perhaps the most 
troubling aspect of his actual innocence position was his 
insistence that the doctrine was a solution in search of a 
problem. When faced with mounting DNA evidence that 
wrongful convictions happen frequently, Justice Scalia 
attempted to parry the concern by arguing that the wrongful-
conviction data showed that the system was working, not 
failing. In Marsh—the second to last case in the Tetraology 
(2006)—he wrote: 
[The dissent] speaks as though exoneration came about through the 
operation of some outside force to correct the mistakes of our legal 
system, rather than as a consequence of the functioning of our legal 
system. Reversal of an erroneous conviction on appeal or on habeas, or 
the pardoning of an innocent condemnee through executive clemency, 
demonstrates not the failure of the system but its success.
39
 
Whatever its rhetorical appeal, this argument confuses—
probably intentionally—two different functions that DNA 
exonerations perform. Exonerations are obviously instances of 
post-conviction “success,” but equally obvious is that they also 
indicate substantial “failure” in the vast majority of cases 
where DNA evidence is unavailable. 
DNA exonerations show what sorts of evidence produce 
wrongful convictions, but there is not DNA available in every 
case. Confessions, informants, junk science, and faulty 
eyewitness testimony do not discriminate—they produce 
unreliable estimates of guilt even where DNA evidence cannot 
exclude a defendant. In Brandon Garret’s landmark study of 
the first 250 DNA exonerations, 89 percent of the exonerees 
had been convicted of rape.
40
 That figure exists not because 
 
 38. See Garrett, supra note 35, at 60–61; see generally BRANDON L. 
GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (2011) (providing a book-length 
exploration of the causes). 
 39. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 193 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 40. See GARRETT, supra note 38, at 5. 
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rape convictions are disproportionately wrongful relative to 
convictions for other types of crimes, but because rape 
convictions disproportionately involve biological material 
necessary to conduct a DNA test and exclude guilt. 
The relative unreliability of prior process, however, is only 
half of the actual innocence calculus. The other half is the 
reliability of the subsequent proceeding. In this respect, DNA 
evidence also altered basic assumptions behind Justice Scalia’s 
position. DNA evidence introduced after a trial might not 
satisfy demands for pure metaphysical truth, but it can be a far 
more reliable approximation than a criminal conviction based 
on other types of information. As the gap between the 
reliability of inferences in prior and subsequent proceedings 
grew, the link between the empirical assumptions and Justice 
Scalia’s preferred doctrinal rule deteriorated. 
C. THE DAVIS LOSS 
The Tetralogy expresses Justice Scalia’s position as a 
doctrinal rule against actual innocence litigation, supported by 
a set of assumptions about the relationship between evidence 
and human knowledge. That doctrinal rule also followed from 
the familiar originalist position that there exists no string of 
constitutional text in which to localize a freestanding claim. 
Justice Scalia could hold out for a Supreme Court majority as 
long as empirical assumptions complemented the doctrinal 
position. 
By 2009, the empirical assumptions had shifted 
dramatically and the window for Justice Scalia to forge a 
winning coalition on the actual innocence position seemed 
closed. In Davis
41
—the last opinion in the Tetralogy and in 
many ways a denouement for the Scalia position—the Court 
cut through all sorts of procedural obstacles to remand the case 
for an actual innocence determination. Davis was, in many 
ways, a litmus test for how severely wrongful-conviction data 
had undermined confidence in the reliability of convictions. 
Except for a shell casing connected to a gun that law 
enforcement never located, Davis was convicted on the basis of 
eyewitness testimony—most of it cross-racial.
42
 (Cross-racial 
eyewitness testimony is particularly unreliable.
43
) Seven of the 
 
 41. In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952 (2009). 
 42. See Kovarsky, supra note 31, at 100. 
 43. See id. 
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nine eyewitnesses had recanted, and one of the non-recanting 
witnesses was the alternative suspect.
44
 
Because Davis involved the circuit court’s denial of 
authorization to pursue a successive habeas petition and 
because there is no certiorari review of such orders,
45
 the Court 
actually ordered the remand by way of an original habeas 
power that had been dormant for decades.
46
 Given the unusual 
procedural posture, the remand actually required five votes, 
including at least two (and perhaps all) of Justices Roberts, 
Kennedy, and Alito. The unsigned per curiam order prompted a 
dissent from Justice Scalia—joined only by Justice Thomas—
underscoring the uncertain status of actual innocence claims. 
The per curiam order signaled that the majority was more 
interested in the bottom line than in the doctrinal details; it 
instructed the district court to “receive testimony and make 
findings of fact as to whether evidence that could not have been 
obtained at the time of trial clearly establishes petitioner’s 
innocence.”
47
 In light of the Justices whose support was 
necessarily for such an order, Davis represented a death knell 
for the position that Justice Scalia had cultivated so 
assiduously since Herrera. 
CONCLUSION 
Davis and its rejection of Justice Scalia’s position is the 
clearest signal of the Supreme Court’s increasing receptivity to 
actual innocence litigation. In Herrera, when Justice Scalia 
began to use actual innocence cases to explain that the 
Constitution permitted systematic criminal punishment in the 
face of some imperfection, many fairly viewed him as a candid 
realist. As wrongful-conviction data mounted, however, he 
clung to the notion that the inevitability of imperfection 
released courts from any obligation to renew scrutiny of 
convictions. 
Recall Justice Scalia’s rejoinder to Justice Blackmun in 
Callins—chastising Justice Blackmun for announcing his 
refusal to “tinker with the machinery of death” in “one of the 
 
 44. See id. 
 45. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) (1996). 
 46. See generally Kovarsky, supra note 31 (discussing development and 
obsolescence of original habeas jurisdiction). 
 47. Davis, 557 U.S. at 952. 
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less brutal of the murders that come before us . . . .”
48
 Justice 
Scalia mocked Justice Blackmun’s moral equivocation by 
describing a gruesome murder for which Henry Lee McCollum 
had been convicted in a co-pending case.
49
 Just before Justice 
Scalia passed away, North Carolina freed Mr. McCollum after a 
DNA test showed that he had spent 30 years on death row for a 
crime he did not commit.
50
 
 
 
 48. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 49. See id. at 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 1143 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 50. See Dahlia Lithwick, A Horrifying Miscarriage of Justice in North 
Carolina, SLATE (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_ 
politics/jurisprudence/2014/09/henry_lee_mccollum_cleared_by_dna_evidence_
in_north_carolina_after_spending.html. 
